GAO: NRC Needs to Reassess Security of NRC-Licensed Research Reactors

February 20, 2008 // Published as a news service by IHS

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) developed the security and emergency response requirements for its research reactors using its design basis threat - a process that establishes a baseline threat for which minimum security measures should be developed, according to the report.

These research reactors benefit from the greater security required for the national laboratories where they are located, which store weapons-usable nuclear materials.

The DOE also concluded that the consequences of an attack at some of its research reactors could be severe, causing radioactivity to be dispersed over many square miles and requiring the evacuation of nearby areas, according to the report.

As a result, all facilities where DOE reactors are located have extensive plans and procedures for responding to security incidents, according to the report.

The NRC based its security and emergency response requirements largely on the regulations it had in place before September 2001. The NRC decided that the security assessment it conducted between 2003 and 2006 showed that these requirements were sufficient, according to the report. While it was conducting this assessment, the NRC worked with licensees to improve security when weaknesses were detected.

However, the report found that the NRC's assessment contained questionable assumptions that created uncertainty about whether the assessment reflected the range of security risks and potential consequences of attacks on research reactors.

For example, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) - a contractor NRC used to assist in performing its assessment - found that some NRC-licensed research reactors may not be prepared for certain types of attacks. However, the NRC disagreed with SNL's finding, according to the report.

In 2006, the NRC concluded that the consequences of attacks would result in minimal radiological exposure to the public. In addition, the NRC assumed that terrorists would use certain tactics in attacking a reactor but did not fully consider alternative attack scenarios that could be more damaging, according to the report. Finally, the NRC assumed that a small part of a reactor could be damaged in an attack resulting in the release of only a small amount of radioactivity.

However, according to experts at Idaho National Laboratories and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, it is possible that a larger part of a reactor could be damaged, which could result in the release of larger amounts of radioactivity, according to the report.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) made progress in changing from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel in U.S. research reactors but may face difficulty in converting some of the remaining research reactors, according to the report.

Since 1978, the NNSA converted eight currently operating U.S. research reactors including two in 2006. In addition, the NNSA plans to convert 10 more U.S. research reactors by September 2014 - five of which are scheduled for conversion by 2009. However, the NNSA faces difficulties in converting the remaining five reactors because these reactors cannot operate with the currently available LEU fuel, according to the report.

The NNSA is developing a new LEU fuel that will allow the remaining five reactors to operate. However, according to the NNSA, developing this fuel has been problematic as early efforts experienced failures during testing. NNSA officials acknowledged that further setbacks are likely to delay plans to convert these research reactors, according to the report.

Purpose of report
There are 37 research reactors in the U.S., mostly located on college campuses. Of these, 33 reactors are licensed and regulated by the NRC. Four are operated by the DOE and are located at three national laboratories. Although less powerful than commercial nuclear power reactors, research reactors may still be targets for terrorists.

In the report the GAO examined the (1) basis on which the DOE and NRC established the security and emergency response requirements for DOE and NRC-licensed research reactors and (2) progress that the NNSA made in converting U.S. research reactors that use HEU to LEU fuel.

The GAO report recommended that the NRC reassess the consequences of terrorist attacks on NRC-licensed research reactors using assumptions that better reflect a fuller range of expert opinion on reactor security.

Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).